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Graseck, Paul · 1588

all judicial; or judicial for some, and praetorian magisterial for others, or conventional for others.
XXX.
What obtains simply in judicial and conventional cases among everyone, holds true in praetorian cases only among those who compete under different, not the same, titles.
XXXI.
Likewise, whether one has a general pledge and another a special one, or a mortgage.
XXXII.
This is so true that he to whom goods were first generally obligated is more potent in claiming and selling off that very thing which was afterwards specifically given as a pledge to another from those same goods.
XXXIII.
And this is the case, even though he might be able to collect his money or debt from the other assets as well.
XXXIV.
For individual things are no less obligated by a general statement than if there had been a specific agreement concerning each one.
XXXV.
However, it is different for him to whom certain things are specifically obligated: and if those are not sufficient, all others are obligated generally for the same cause.
XXXVI.
For as long as one can be satisfied from a special mortgage,