... Conclusiones aliquot physiologicae de sensibus

XXXIII.
The medium of taste for Aristotle was the tongue, just as the flesh is for touch (book 2, On the Soul, context 116).

XXXIV.
Furthermore, some animals have all these five senses, some have some, others have only one, namely Touch; for no animal can be devoid of this (book 2, On the Soul, context 23). Taste also accompanies Touch; for it is, as it were, a certain kind of Touch (book 2, On the Soul, context 94 & 101; book 3, context 63).

XXXV.
These two senses, therefore, are for necessity; the remaining three are for tes soterias of preservation/survival, and were given to us to on for the sake of existence [or living]; and Sight and Hearing are especially for the sake of Wisdom and Prudence (book 3, On the Soul, final context; and book On Sense and Sensible, chapter 1).

XXXVI.
Taste is more exact for us than Smell; much more so is Touch, which man has more exact than other living creatures (book 2, On the Soul, context 93 & 94), which Aristotle, however, asserts there is taken from the softness or hardness of the flesh as a judgment of man's phyes nature/constitution; it is only probable.

XXXVII.
So that the senses do not err in their proper object, Alexander and Themistius observed these four conditions: 1. that the sensory organ be intact; 2. that the sensible objects be situated in a legitimate place, not an uncertain one; 3. that the distance be appropriate; 4. that the medium not be unclean.

XXXVIII.
These images of external things, drawn from the external senses, go into the common sense, which is their judge and evaluator: if these are imprinted more deeply, then the conservative faculty of Memory retains them, and, when they are in a way lost, Recollection—proper to humans alone—recalls them; if the common sense turns and treats these same things, the creative faculty and phantasia imagination arise: from which finally, as we have said, Appetite comes to be, which moves and impels the motive power by the benefit of the Animal spirit.

XXXIX.
From which it is clear that all these things exist in the primary sense,