Theses De legum interpretatione

because it can be conjectured in various ways, in order to proceed more distinctly, some things must be submitted individually from which we may say the true exposition, moderation, and direction of the law can be sought and derived.

IX.

Before all else, therefore, the greatest consideration must be given to consuetudo custom; just as it has interpreted the present law in past cases of this kind, so let us not doubt in understanding it.

X.

Failing this, the context of the law must be weighed, and the preceding and subsequent sections must be meditated upon with diligent inquiry, if perhaps the true sense can be more certainly established.

XI.

Once this is found, one need not labor further regarding the words. For the sake of saving the meaning, the words must be dragged toward an improper signification.

XII.

If we can gain or achieve nothing from that, other laws must be consulted and called into support; and it must be seen whether something can be found there that can provide a suitable and convenient interpretation.

XIII.

Where the matter still refuses to proceed in this way, then finally, the genuine understanding must be borrowed from jus naturale natural law.

XIV.

It makes no difference whether the matter in question in the law is of strict law, odious, or penal.

XV.

And if perhaps, as often happens, two natural laws seem to concur and oppose one another, the one that is superior must be embraced; or, if both are equal in this regard, the one that is more specific.

XVI.

At this point, it should not be overlooked that in the three preceding cases, we are dealing with civil aequitas equity; whose authority is greater than that of natural and unwritten equity: but in the most recent case, the interpretation is said to be made from natural and unwritten equity, or from what is equitable and good.