Theses De legum interpretatione

XVII.

It should also be noted that as often as mention is made of the equitable or of equity, or when anything is held concerning what is equitable and good, it is more frequently taken in the natural sense.

XIIX.

This natural equity, in order that all perplexity may be more rightly avoided, must deservedly be distinguished from all those things that, because they agree with it in kind, mode, or effect, are wont to come under its name in popular usage in the Law.

XIX.

We say, therefore, that we do not take it here for law or for justice considered by itself, especially since it is itself more preeminent than that.

XX.

Nor do we understand by it whatever only faith, probity, equality, or honesty suggests, and whatever is merely in accordance with justice and natural reason.

XXI.

Indeed, we do not even grant that it is what consists always in clemency and kindness, being contrary to rigor and severity.

XXII.

So that we consider it only as opposed to the subtlety of law, and to the strict and supreme law, in which we attend only to the narrowness of the words, from which supreme injustice original: "summa injuria" is said to arise.

XXIII.

And let us acknowledge that it is that one alone which Aristotle The philosopher who discussed the 'lesbian rule' of flexible measurement compared with the most appropriate similitude of the Lesbian rule; and which he said was the amendment of the legitimate just, or that which is just beyond the written law.

XXIV.

Although it can still be more fully described, so that it may be said,