Theses De legum interpretatione

XXXII.

Since the method for defining this matter is not so easy that it can be fully comprehended in a single statement, it seems that three things must be considered for its better explanation.

XXXIII.

For either the words of the law are so doubtful that we are deprived of everything from which we might in any way be able to aspire to the will of the Legislator: so that not only are the words ambiguous and obscure, but the meaning also is completely hidden. And in this case, it must certainly be held that interpretation from the equitable and good, unless it is done by the Prince alone (who must be approached in this case), by no means lays claim to a place for itself.

XXXIV.

For then the will of the law, which is non-existent, would not be conferred to the standard of equity: but rather a completely new law would be seen to be constituted.

XXXV.

Or the words are indeed doubtful: but their ambiguity is such that it does not overturn all certainty of meaning, and thus is not entirely an impediment to reaching the sense and mind of the Legislator by some traces. Here, there is no hesitation that the judge can moderate the law from the equitable and good; indeed, he is even most highly obligated to do so.

XXXVI.

For since laws were imposed not by words, but by things, he is bound to perform this most highly, that the meaning of the laws not be circumvented by him while saving the words.

XXXVII.

But if he presumes to take no account of this, and to adhere solely to the words: just as he would be thought to have judged against the laws, so, whether he did this knowingly or imprudently, he would both derive a lawsuit upon himself and offer no judgment. That which...