Theses De legum interpretatione

the last point, however, does not hold if he has pronounced judgment in such a way only upon the right of the litigant: for in that case, an appeal is necessary.

XXXVIII.

What has been said regarding judges may rightly be said of subjects in this regard; namely, that where they wish to live according to the law, they should not embrace that sense of the words which they see to be alien to the will of the Legislator and not at all in agreement with it.

XXXIX.

Otherwise, those who offend against the law will not be able to protect themselves so effectively under the shield of words that they will not be subject to the penalties designated for violators of the law, simply because they followed the words.

XL.

Or, which is the final and third point of the distinction, the words are indeed most clear and have no obscurity in themselves: but in the way they sound, they do not satisfy the judgment of everyone, and thus do not seem to conform and respond fully to reason and justice in every part. Here, in turn, the matter must be explained by a distinction.

XLI.

For when words are thus clear and perspicuous, either the matter that has been called into controversy and awaits the determination of the judge is found to be expressly decided and defined therein in its more specific terms; or it is seen to be entirely omitted; or it is neither entirely omitted nor specifically determined.

XLII.

In the former case, when it is better that the opinion of the Legislator should not be seen as that which is clearly contrary to plain and perspicuous words, the role of the judge ceases, and the words should not be evaded or twisted by a defect of writing to a sense that is alien to them.

XLIII.

This holds to such an extent that even if the law appears harsh, the judges