Theses De legum interpretatione

must yield to their duty of interpreting and limiting, and acknowledge it as the law to be followed in judgment: and subjects, by readily obeying it, should not be unwilling to comply.

XLIV.

And this is where the commonly held saying applies, that one should not anxiously dispute the laws of Princes, nor inquire too scrupulously into their reasons.

XLV.

However, what has just been said should be understood to be true only if something is decreed more harshly regarding those matters in which the philosopher Aristotle considered the legitimate law to be engaged: that is, matters in which, before laws are passed or unanimous approval of men is given, it does not matter for the sake of justice and honesty whether they are done in this way or another.

XLVI.

Here are contained those things which are secondary jus gentium law of nations, as well as those which the law of nature leaves as indifferent to the choice of men, to be changed, corrected, restored, or varied as the reason of time and place may seem to require.

XLVII.

But the matter is far different in that law of nature which, being unique, is properly called such, and consists either in commanding or prohibiting. This is ingrained equally in the wicked and the righteous, and is always valid, firm, and immutable.

XLVIII.

This is what must be understood when it is said: that a law repugnant to nature is null: and likewise: that an unreasonable custom is considered to be of no moment.

XLIX.

In the other case, it cannot be obscure that there can and should be a place for equity to be interposed by the judge: since we see so often that those things which had been omitted by the laws were supplemented by the Jurists and the Praetor: and beyond this, at other times, this matter is also entrusted to the ministry of the interpreter in the constitutions of laws.

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