Theses De legum interpretatione

L.
Nor, however, should it be thought that whenever something has been omitted by the laws, an extension must immediately and indiscriminately be made to all cases, in which the reason of those laws might seem to claim some place for itself.

LI.
For what if the law that is being considered for extension introduces some privilege or contains something received contrary to the reason of the law? Certainly, there would be no room left for extension.

LII.
The third case was when that which is brought into controversy is neither expressly decided by law, nor entirely omitted, but is only comprehended in general words. And in this case, we must likewise conclude that we can interpret the law from the equitable and good, and contract and moderate what is stated in it too generally.

LIII.
This is especially permissible for us when we notice that it cannot be accepted generally without some absurdity following from it, that is, that it either opposes some other law or protests against natural law itself:

LIV.
Or we have ascertained that the founder of the law had a certain reason in mind, which is clearly not in force in that species of fact which we propose to exempt from the general rule of the law.

LV.
Whether that reason is express or not, provided it is the only one: or when it is double, and one of them is not sufficient by itself. For when one of these ceases, what was introduced or established is extinguished.

LVI.
Where, however, it must be well noted that the diversity of causes should not impose upon us. For if we perceive that the impulsive cause ceases in some case, we should not immediately think that the law itself also ceases to obtain, as if the final cause and true reason were absent.