Theses de appellationib. attentatis et inhibitionibus

VII.
It is also permitted, in the name of one who is being led to punishment, to appeal for reasons of humanity. For who would stop one who has been condemned from appealing? The punishment must be delayed.

VIII.
Furthermore, if in one and the same case one person has appealed, and his appeal has been pronounced just, the Emperor Alexander referring to Emperor Alexander Severus decreed in a rescript that it also benefits the one who did not appeal.

IX.
Furthermore, it is permitted to appeal from all judges, both ordinary and delegated.

X.
However, it is a matter of undoubted law that it is not permitted to appeal from the Prince, since he is the one to whom the appeal is made, just as it is not permitted to appeal from the Senate or the Praetorian Prefect.

XI.
Whether it is possible to appeal from the sentence of an arbitrator reached by compromise is a question of ambiguous status. We will see in which of Bartolus's Bartolus de Saxoferrato, a famous medieval jurist distinctions this can be defended.

XII.
Indeed, in arbitrations by necessity of law or statute, or those given by a judge, the remedy of appeal remains, unless they were appointed by the Prince with the appeal removed, or the parties renounced the appeal.

XIII.
Does the remedy of appeal have a place against a judge's sentence of reduction delivered by an arbitrator? We conclude that it does have a place, and that a reduction