but infinite things assist the human body. Therefore, things beyond nature are infinite, and consequently not only three.

THESIS I.

Minor premise: because tactile and secondary invisible qualities, such as lightness, or the sound of a tone, and those which are olfactive, auditory, and gustatory, such as bitter or salty, constitute an infinite pain-causing composition, that is, one from which pain is effected: and that which is opposed to pleasure, which will be our subject. There are as many things beyond nature as there are secondary to nature. Therefore, there are also things beyond nature and not. Major premise: if one of the opposites is posited, the other is as well. For one calls the hot cold, the hot in itself is always one. Therefore, the other is also said of one of the opposites, and of evil.

That three things beyond Nature come to our body, namely Disease, Cause, and Symptom, almost all physicians generally acknowledge from Galen: but whether there are only three kinds of Symptoms, namely impaired Action, fault of Excrements, and a simple Affection of the body, is not agreed.

II.

For, to omit many other things, all argue sharply about Pain, whether it is a symptom different from others, or an impaired action, or whether it ought to be referred to it: nor is it agreed what its Nature and Accidents should be considered.

III.

Moreover, bodily pain, of which we treat here, signifies two things: Another: —

IV.

That which ought to be affected by pain must, of necessity, be alloiōsin te kai aisthēton an alteration and perceptible, Galen rightly asserted in book 1, On Elements, ch. 2, and On the Constitution of the Art, ch. 8. Minor premise: natural things, but if they are often nature. Therefore, it is that.

V.

Whence, pain is correctly defined as a sad perception of a sensible thing: or, as Galen himself speaks, ho gar toi ponos aisthēsis estin aniara, kathaper hē hēdonē tesounēs aisthēsis for pain is indeed a painful sensation, just as pleasure is a pleasant sensation. Book 2, On Affected Parts, ch. 2.

VI.

And therefore we are not moved by the judgment of those who, against Galen, deny that it ought to be referred to a depraved Action, and think it is a symptom of another kind.

VII.

For we defend that what they bring forward—that Pain effects nothing so that it might be an Action, nor has any object, nor is the action of any sensorium so that it might be a Sensation—has little firmness.

VIII.

But neither do we concede that, for this reason, Pain [is] of a depraved Action Against 2. That which ends in action, but pain is a symptom [illegible] therefore of diseases. Thus it is not an Eppuia symptom. Minor premise: Every sensation of a mixture impairs action. Pain is from mixtures. Therefore, pain impairs action: Minor premise: because the sense of touch is the greatest