Theoria pathologica de dolore

...is unable to be a symptom, because it is felt exactly, and not depravedly.

IX.
Also, pain is defined badly by some, and not according to Aristotle as they think, as a passion in the appetite, following cognition and the judgment of the sense.

X.
Finally, we deny that Pain is a molestation which is perceived by acting, done in certain actions, while the continuum is dissolved, as a certain Censor persuaded himself.

XI.
The CAUSES of Pain are no less controversial than the genus itself.

XII.
For a fourfold opinion concerning its Efficient cause appears everywhere among the primary [authors].

XIII.
For many establish it as either intemperance, or the solution of the continuum; some, that one alone; others, only this one; finally, some establish both conjoined at the same time.

XIV.
Many judge the authors of the former opinion to be Hippocrates, Galen, and Avicenna, in the book On Man; book 4, On the Causes of Symptoms, ch. 6; book 12, Method, ch. 7; and in the 2nd canon, 1st doctrine, ch. 19.

XV.
To whom we must agree, the reasons of the authors themselves move us: for they truly propose that an entire member is in pain, in the individual parts of which, however, no solution of the continuum is present.

XVI.
Similarly, they deservedly testify that heat and cold effect pain without any solution of the continuum, and that this sometimes happens without any pain molesting.

XVII.
Then, if Pain is the sensation of a contrary thing, why will intemperance alone not produce it?