CHAPTER I.

CRITICAL PRESENTATION OF THEORETICAL VIEWS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEMENTIA PRÆCOX.

The interpretation of the psychological disturbances of dementia præcox is found in literature only in the form of fragmentary attempts which, although they at times go quite far, nowhere have any clear coordination. The statements of the older authors have only limited value, as they refer now to one form and now to another of mental disease that can only be indefinitely classified as dementia præcox. Hence, one must not attribute any general validity to them. The first general view concerning the nature of the psychological disturbance in catatonia was that of Tschisch 1 Cited from Ehrich Arndt: On the History of Catatonia, who, in 1886, thought it was essentially due to an inability to focus attention. A similar but somewhat differently conceived view was given by Freusberg 2 Freusberg, 1886, Archive for Psychology. He stated that the automatic actions of the catatonic are associated with a state of reduced consciousness, which causes a loss of control over their psychical processes. The motor disturbances are merely symptomatic expressions of the degree of psychic tension.

According to Freusberg, the motor catatonic symptoms are dependent upon corresponding psychological manifestations. The "weakening of consciousness" points to the quite modern view of Pierre Janet. Kraepelin 3 Textbook of Psychiatry, Aschaffenburg 4 General Journal of Psychology, Ziehen, and others also affirm that there is a disturbance of attention. In 1894, we meet for the first time with an experimental psychological work on the subject of catatonia: the investigation by Sommer, "On the Study of 'Inhibition' of Mental Processes" 5 General Journal of Psychology, Vol. L.

The author makes the following statements, which are of general significance: (1) The flow of ideation is retarded. (2) The attention of the patient is frequently so fixed by pictures shown to them that they can only with difficulty rid themselves of them.