Conjectura cabbalistica

a Cabbala, and from whom I received it; what may be the probabilities of the truth of it; and what my purpose is in publishing of it.

To the first I answer; That the Jewish Cabbala is conceived to be a Traditional Doctrine or Exposition of the Pentateuch The first five books of the Bible. which Moses received from the mouth of God, while he was on the Mount with him. And this sense or interpretation of the Law or Pentateuch, as it is a doctrine received by Moses first, and then from him by Joshua, and from Joshua by the seventy Elders, and so on, it was called Cabbala from קבל kibbel, meaning to receive: But as it was delivered as well as received, it was also called Massora, which signifies a Tradition; though this latter more properly respects that Critical and Grammatical skill of the Learned among the Jews, and therefore was profitable for the explaining the literal sense as well as that more mysterious meaning of the Text where it was intended. Whence without any boldness or abuse of the word I may call the Literal interpretation which I have light upon Cabbala, as well as the Philosophical or Moral; the literal sense itself being not so plain and determinate, but that it may seem to require some Traditional Doctrine or Exposition to settle it, as well as those other senses that are more mystical.

And therefore I thought fit to call this threefold interpretation that I have hit upon, Cabbala's, as if I had indeed light upon the true Cabbala of Moses in all the three senses of the Text, such as might have become his own mouth to have uttered for the instru-

ction of a willing and well prepared Disciple. And therefore for the greater comeliness and solemnity of the matter, I bring in Moses speaking his own mind in all the three several Expositions.

And yet I call the whole Interpretation but a Conjecture, having no desire to seem more definitively wise than others can bear or approve of. For though in such things as are necessary and essential to the happiness of a man, as the belief that there is a God, and the like; it is not sufficient for a man only to bring undeniable reasons for what he would prove, but also to profess plainly and dogmatically, that himself gives full assent to the conclusion he hath demonstrated. So that those that do not so well understand the power of reason, may notwithstanding thereby be encouraged to be of the same faith with them that do, it being of so great consequence to them to believe the thing propounded: Yet I conceive that Speculative and Dispensable Truths a man not only may, but ought rather to propound them Sceptically to the world, there being more prudence and modesty in offering the strongest arguments he can without dogmatizing at all, or seeming to dote upon the conclusion, or more earnestly to affect the winning of Proselytes to his own opinion. For where the force of the arguments is perceived, assent will naturally follow according to the proportion of the discovery of the force of the arguments. And an assent to opinions merely speculative, without the reasons of them, is neither any pleasure nor accomplishment of a rational creature.