PREFACE

V. The last method of their reasoning finds its ground in experience and observation, which they themselves or others who are trustworthy have of things that exist outside their ideas, and in no way in their concepts alone. Thus, a good astronomus astronomer bases his science on what he, or others whom he believes, have found by experience: namely, that there truly is a terrestrial globe, a sun, a moon visible to the eyes; five planets, some of which have satellites, and a great multitude of fixed stars. He does not base it on his concepts or imagination, through which he could imagine a world of a different shape; for example, one with ten suns, a hundred moons, a thousand planets, and very few fixed stars. Regarding such an imaginary world, he could still make many demonstrations; these might be mathematically true according to the first way of reasoning, yet when applied to actual things, they would be completely false.

VI. Whoever has read and understands Spinoza Baruch Spinoza, the philosopher knows that he sets only his ideas and intellect as the ground of everything, which therefore needs no further proof here. From this, it can be evident to everyone that he mistakenly applies that method of finding truths to essential things; a method which true mathematicians never use, except concerning their own ideas. This is why the entire sequence of so many propositions and so-called demonstrations in the book by Spinoza referring to Spinoza's "Ethics" can show nothing else to anyone than the properties of those imaginations and concepts which this unfortunate author formed within himself. This remains true even if he reasoned soundly from those grounds, though the contrary can be proven in many cases. No one can conclude anything more about actual things from his work than an astronomus astronomer could do if he wanted to take his own imagination for the true state of the heavens.

VII. Thus, from this mistake alone, the instability of all the reasonings of Spinoza can be seen at a glance; it shows how little his way of proving agrees with that of the true Mathematici Mathematicians.

§. 12. But to proceed after this digression. Because these unfortunate Philosophen philosophers attribute so much to their intellect, and are accustomed to exerting all their sharpness to oppose the power of all metaphysische metaphysical arguments, even those based on good reasoning, I have seen only one thing that is effective in stripping away their ruinous pride of understanding everything. To convince them of the smallness of their intellect, which is primarily necessary for their conversion, one should bring them into a Chymisch Laboratorium chemical laboratory or another place where it is customary to perform physische physical experiments that are not known to everyone. One should ask them, if this or that were to happen, what they would think should follow according to their intellect and ideas.

When they fail in this, and contrary experiments are shown to them, no excuses of any weight remain for them to avoid the confession that their intellect extends very little to actual things. This is not to mention those experiments that can be shown to them which, if they do not run against the clearest concepts of the best reasoners, at least surpass them until now. And in case they do not see the experience itself, or if the power and wisdom of the Maker and Governor is not as unmistakably noticeable therein as the intellect and skill of any craftsman is in the work he has made.

I could bring forward examples here where these means were blessed alone, after many others had been applied for a long time in vain; were it not that the importance of the matter has already detained us long enough in this.

§. 13. Besides these mentioned four causes, other occasions for Ongodisterye godlessness or atheism have occurred to me. These are not as strictly counted among the causes as the previous ones, but they nevertheless provide a step toward it for various people and have brought them, if not always to denial, at least to doubts about the highest truths.

The first of this kind are the Vooroordeelen prejudices; some of which are born with us, or have their origin in our addiction to our external senses. Thus, one imagines, to give an example, the sun to be no larger than a table plate or a small dish, and its distance from us to be very small. In the same way, the planets appear to us as insignificant and contemptible in size. Having this imprinted in us gives occasion to think of the great works of God with too little awe; since they appear to us in this way, they seem to need little power to be made and governed. However, if one considered the world in its immeasurable extent, the sun as a vyerkloot fireball of such a terrible greatness, and the planets, some of which could contain thousands of terrestrial globes, according to their true nature; these would cause us to form entirely different thoughts and lead us to stand in wonder at the formidable power of the Maker and Governor.

Another Vooroordeel prejudice that makes us notice too little wisdom and governance in the visible world is that, where we see nothing physical or no motion, we are accustomed to judging that there truly is nothing and no motion. For thinking that what is at rest will always remain at rest without anything else being required, everything appears to us