The Metaphysics of Aristotle

subservient to it, such as his Topics, his books On Sophistical (i.e., apparent) Arguments, and On the Art of Rhetoric. And such is the summary and universal division of the writings of Aristotle.

2dly. The end of Aristotle's moral philosophy is perfection through the virtues, and the end of his contemplative philosophy is a union with the one principle of all things: for he scientifically knew and unfolded this principle, as is evident from the twelfth book of the following work, in which he clearly pronounces that the original: "the domination of many is not good." rule of the many is not good. The common end, however, both of his moral and contemplative philosophy, which man ought to pursue, is the last and most perfect felicity felicity: In this context, the highest state of human happiness and fulfillment. of which our nature is capable; and at the end of his Nicomachean Ethics, he testifies that he who arrives at this felicity ought not to be called a man, but a god. All the works of the philosopher lead us to the attainment of this end: for some of them unfold to us the art of demonstration; others, that we may become virtuous, instruct us in morals; and lastly, others lead us to the knowledge of natural things, and afterwards to those luminous beings which are placed above nature.

With respect to his diction diction: Style of writing or word choice., it is of that kind where the words adhere to the sense and the sense to the words; a mode of writing both intellectual and admirably adapted to the profundity of his conceptions: for he either immediately gives a solution to a doubt, or, by connecting many doubts, he briefly solves all of them by one and the same solution. He is likewise never willing to deviate from evidence, which, being produced either by intellect or sense, he especially adduces and celebrates the latter when he disputes with those who in everything consider sense as the standard of truth. Hence, there is such an irresistible strength in his demonstrations that, when he cannot persuade by assumptions not rashly introduced, he at least procures assent by the force of necessity.