The Metaphysics of Aristotle

the necessities, the comforts, and the refinements of the merely human life; and partial and unscientific is that definition of virtue, which limits its highest energies to those of morality: for moral virtue is more human, but intellectual more divine. The former is preparatory to felicity; but the latter, when perfect, is accompanied with perfect beatitude. Virtuous, therefore, is the man who relieves the corporeal wants of others, who wipes away the tear of sorrow, and gives agony repose; but more virtuous he, who, by disseminating wisdom, expels ignorance from the soul, and thus benefits the immortal part of man: for it may indeed be truly said, that he who has not even a knowledge of common things is a brute among men; that he who has an accurate knowledge of human concerns alone, is a man among brutes; but, that he who knows all that can be known by intellectual energy, is a god among men.

Wisely, therefore, does Plato assert that the philosopher ought not to descend below species, and that he should be solely employed in the contemplation of wholes and universals. For he who descends below these, descends into Cimmerian (dark/shadowy) realms, and Hades itself, wanders among spectres devoid of mind, and exposes himself to the danger of beholding the real Gorgon (a monster that turns gazers to stone), or the dire face of Matter, and of thus becoming petrified by a satiety of stupid passions.

The life of the man who, possessing true wisdom, energizes according to theoretic virtue, is admirably described by Plato in his Theætetus as follows:

Socrates. Let us speak, since it is agreeable to you, about the coryphæi (leaders/philosophers). For why should any one speak of those who are conversant with philosophy in a depraved manner? In the first place, then, the coryphæi from their youth neither know the way to the forum, nor where the court of justice or senate-house is