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Truly, prayers sent forth divinely, in which a divine power resides, bring me benefit. These things are argued against Porphyry, who thinks that we should specifically worship the mundane gods Gods associated with the physical world or the cosmos. because they possess sensation. Likewise, Porphyry thinks that supplications Humble prayers or petitions. are not at all suitable to the purity of divine minds; however, Iamblichus thinks they are suitable because of the intimate sense that exists within supplications, especially those that are given divinely. Pure intellects know sensible things without the use of physical senses.
Porphyry says that certain material things are employed in supplications, and therefore they are only employed for those gods who are living beings original: "animalia." In this context, it refers to beings that possess a soul and sensory organs.. Iamblichus responds that in those material things, beyond their physical qualities, there lie hidden incorporeal and divine reasons, forms, and measures, through which the things employed are made congruent Compatible or in harmony with. with the gods. Indeed, whatever is brought forward that is in any way consistent with and similar to the gods, the gods are soon present; they join themselves to it, offer their gifts, and hear the prayers. A certain small congruity of our world’s things to the gods is enough for us to draw something from them. For they are always most ready for this because of their natural goodness and wonderful power. Indeed, a most powerful cause acts upon matter even if it is only slightly prepared. Porphyry distinguishes Demons original: "Dæmones." Intermediate spirits, not necessarily evil. from gods by the fact that the former are incorporeal while the latter are corporeal. Iamblichus says that their substances and properties cannot be distinguished by these marks.
The celestial gods can be called incorporeal because no hindrance from their bodies occurs to interfere with their more excellent action and the happiness of their life. But insofar as the gods tend toward the One The ultimate, indivisible source of all existence in Neoplatonic thought., their bodies strive toward the same by their own accord; they do not "contain" souls, but rather are themselves contained most excellently by souls. The celestial body is most akin to incorporeal things because of its simple, undivided, and constant nature, and its single action—which is its circular revolution—and its innate life and light. In heaven, there is no composition of soul and body into a single "third nature," but the body is drawn entirely toward the nature of the soul and is, as it were, a kind of visible soul. Perhaps heaven is light itself, without matter and without dimension. Dimension appears there only because of the light's vast presence. Whence heaven is the soul of heaven adapting itself to our eyes and to perishable things, and that circle is the circuit of the soul, and the light is the intellect of that same soul. Just as in the lowest of bodies the form becomes material, so in the highest, matter becomes formal; it is a "soul-like body" rather than a "bodily soul," if indeed there is any matter in heaven at all. Just as the highest air becomes fiery, so celestial fire becomes soul-like. That intellectual soul turns into intellect.