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Onetor writes in the book titled Whether the Wise Man Should Make Money that the comic poet Epicharmus A 5th-century BC poet and philosopher from Sicily, often credited with inventing comedy and exploring philosophical themes in verse. contributed much to Plato, who transcribed many things from him. This is mentioned by Alcimus in the four books he wrote To Amyntas. In the first of these, he says: "It is clear that Plato took many things from the books of Epicharmus." This can be seen as follows: Plato asserts that the sensible Things perceived through the five senses. is that which never remains the same in quantity or quality, but is always flowing and changing. For example, if you take number away from things, they are no longer equal, nor of any specific type, nor of a certain quantity or quality. Furthermore, these are things whose existence is always a process of "becoming," but which never truly "are" in substance. On the other hand, the intelligible Things understood by the mind or intellect, like mathematical truths or abstract concepts. is that to which nothing is added and from which nothing is taken away. This is the nature of eternal things, which happens to be always similar and the same. Moreover, Alcimus adds that the wise say the soul perceives some things through the body—such as by seeing and hearing—but it perceives other things by itself, using no bodily function. For this reason, of the things that exist, some are perceived by the senses, while others are comprehended by the power of the intellect. Therefore, Plato also said that those who wish to grasp the principles of all things must first distinguish the Forms Ideas or archetypes (eide) that Plato believed were the true reality behind physical objects according to themselves—such as Likeness, Unity, Multitude, Magnitude, Rest, and Motion. Second, one must consider the Good, the Just, and the Beautiful in and of themselves. Third, one must observe how the Forms relate to one another, such as Knowledge, Magnitude, or Mastery, while also considering that the things in our world are named after them because they participate in them. For example, I say things are "just" because they share in Justice, and "beautiful" because they share in Beauty. Each Form is eternal, a concept of the mind, and moreover, free from all change. Because of this, he said that the Forms stand in nature like patterns or archetypes, and that other things are similar to them, existing as their likenesses. Epicharmus, then, discusses the Good and the Forms in this way: "Is the playing of the flute a real thing?" "Certainly." "Is a man, then, the flute-playing itself?" "By no means." "Come, let us see: does a flute-player seem to you to be a man, or not?" "A man, surely."
"Therefore, does it not seem to you that the same applies to the Good? That the Good is one thing, and the specific instance is another? If a person learns that Goodness itself, he is then made good. Just as someone who learns flute-playing becomes a flute-player, or one who learns dancing becomes a dancer, or a weaver becomes a weaver; and in this same way, regarding anything else you please, the one who learns it is called not the art itself, but the practitioner of the art." In his view of the Forms, Plato says: "If memory exists, then the Forms must exist in things, because memory is of something that is quiet and remaining; but nothing remains except the Forms. For in what way," he asks, "could living creatures be preserved unless they had touched upon the Form and, in addition, received a natural mind?" Now he mentions Likeness and the kind of nourishment they usually have, showing that to animals... The text cuts off here, likely continuing the argument that animals possess an instinctive "memory" of certain Forms that allows them to survive and recognize what is beneficial to them.
"Does it not seem to you, then, that it is the same with the Good? The Good is the thing itself, and the action is another? Unless someone learns it for himself, having studied it, he cannot become good. Just as if someone learns flute-playing to be a flute-player, or dancing to be a dancer, or weaving to be a weaver, or indeed any such thing you like, he is not the art itself, but is certainly a practitioner of it." Plato, in his conception of the Forms, says: "If there is memory, then the Forms must exist among being, because memory is of something that is at rest and stays; and nothing stays except the Forms. For in what way," he says, "would living creatures have survived if they did not grasp the Form and receive a natural intellect for this purpose? But now he recalls likeness and nourishment, of what sort it is for them, indicating that..."