OF PLATO

THE CHARACTER OF HIS DISCOURSE

...or we disapprove, likewise through the questioning and response of those debating. Truly, the style of Platonic discourse is twofold, and both are of the highest quality. One of these, which instructs and imparts knowledge, is called instructional original: "ὑφηγητικός" (hyphegetikos); a style used for teaching established doctrines.; the other is engaged in inquiry and is called investigative original: "ζητητικός" (zetetikos); a style used for searching for truth through questioning.. The former is divided into two types: one consists of speculation, the other in action. The first is further divided into the natural and rational, while the second is divided into the moral and civil. Furthermore, that second investigative style is likewise split into two species: the first, which is for training, is called gymnastic; the second is for contests and is called agonistic From "agon," meaning a struggle or contest; a combative style of argument.. Moreover, the gymnastic division is itself bipartite: one part fosters the first cradles of exercise and is called maieutic The "midwifery" method, where Socrates helps others "give birth" to their own ideas.; the other now relies on its own strength and tests what it can do, and is called peirastic A "testing" or "probing" method used to see if a person truly understands a subject.. Likewise, there is a bipartite distinction in the agonistic style: one serves for demonstration and is called endeictic; the other exhorts and is called anatreptic A "refutative" or "upsetting" style used to knock down an opponent's false arguments.. Nor does it escape us that many distinguish Plato's dialogues differently than we do. For they say some are dramatic, because they seem to imitate a poem; others, because they serve a narrative, are called diegetic; and others they call mixed. But truly, that distinction of dialogues seems more suited to the stage of the theater than the school of philosophers.

There are some among these that pertain to Physics (Natural Philosophy), such as the Timaeus; to Logic, such as the Statesman, Cratylus, Parmendes, and Sophist; there are those which pertain to Ethics (Morals), such as the Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium, Menexenus, Clitophon, the Epistles, Philebus, Hipparchus, and the Lovers; and to Politics (Civil matters), truly the Republic, the Laws, Minos, Epinomis, and the Atlantic Known today as the Critias.. The Maieutic style is found in the two Alcibiades, Theages, Lysis, and Laches; the Peirastic in Euthyphro, Meno, Ion, Charmides, and Theaetetus; the Endeictic in Protagoras; and the Anatreptic in Euthydemus, the two Hippiases, and Gorgias. So much for the dialogue, what it is, and what its differences are.

But since there is infinite contention, with some saying that he introduces dogmas Fixed doctrines or teachings. and others denying it, let us see about these things as well. It is the property of a dogmatist to bring forth a dogma, just as it is for a legislator to establish laws. Furthermore, dogmas or decrees are called indifferently both the things we think and the opinion itself. Of these, however, that which we think is a proposition, while the opinion is the persuasion or the act of thinking itself. Plato, therefore, explains the things he has perceived, and refutes those which are false. Regarding uncertain things, he does not define them. And concerning those things which he himself thinks, he introduces four persons: Socrates, Timaeus, the Athenian Stranger, and the Eleatic Stranger. These strangers are not (as some think) Plato and Parmenides, but are nameless fictions. When he speaks the words of Socrates and Timaeus, Plato is introducing his decrees. To refute lies, he introduces Thrasymachus, Callicles, Polus, Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, Euthydemus, and others of this kind. But truly, when there is a place for proofs and the conclusions of arguments, he makes great use of induction, and that not in one way, but in two. For induction is a discourse that, from certain words, properly collects and infers a truth similar to itself. Its species are two: that which is made from the contrary, and that which is from the consequent. That which is from the contrary is of such a kind that a contrary response is inferred for the one questioning about everything. As, for example: "My father is either someone other than your father, or he is the same." If, therefore, my father is someone other than your father, since he is other than a father, he will not be a father. If he is the same as my father, being the same as my father, he will be my father. And again: "If a man is not an animal, he will be a stone or wood." But he is not a stone or wood, for he is animate and moves by himself; therefore he is an animal. But if...

...or by one establishing a point through the questioning and answering of those in dialogue. Of the Platonic discourse, there are two highest characters: the instructional and the investigative. The instructional is divided into two other characters, the theoretical and the practical. And the theoretical is divided into the physical and the logical; while the practical is divided into the ethical and political. Of the investigative itself, there are two primary characters, the gymnastic and the agonistic. Of the gymnastic, there is the maieutic and the peirastic; and of the agonistic, the endeictic and anatreptic. It has not escaped us that some say the dialogues differ in other ways. For they call some of them dramatic, others diegetic, and others mixed. But those people have made the distinction of the dialogues more like a writer of tragedies than a philosopher. Among those categorized as physical is the Timaeus; as logical, the Statesman, Cratylus, Parmenides, and Sophist; as ethical, the Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium, Menexenus, Clitophon, the Letters, Philebus, Hipparchus, and the Lovers. Among the political, the Republic, the Laws, Minos, Epinomis, and the Atlantic; among the maieutic, the Alcibiades, Theages, Lysis, and Laches; among the peirastic, Euthyphro, Meno, Ion, Charmides, and Theaetetus; among the endeictic, such as the Protagoras; and of the anatreptic, Euthydemus, the two Hippiases, and Gorgias. And concerning the dialogue, what it is and what its differences are, let this suffice.

But since there is much discord, with some saying he dogmatizes and others not, let us also discuss these things. To dogmatize, then, is to lay down a dogma, just as to legislate is to lay down laws. A dogma is called in two ways: that which is thought, and the thought itself. Of these, that which is thought is a proposition; and the thought is a conception. Therefore, those things Plato has understood as true, he declares; the false things he refutes; and concerning the unclear, he withholds judgment. Regarding his own views, he speaks through four persons: Socrates, Timaeus, the Athenian Stranger, and the Eleatic Stranger. These strangers are not, as some have supposed, Plato and Parmenides, but are anonymous inventions; however, when Plato speaks the words of Socrates and Timaeus, he is dogmatizing. To represent those whose falsehoods are being refuted, he introduces such men as Thrasymachus, Callicles, Polus, Gorgias, and Protagoras, and in addition to all these, Euthydemus and others like them. In making his proofs, he makes great use of the inductive method. It is not of a single type, but twofold. For induction is a discourse that through certain truths brings in a truth similar to itself. There are two types of induction: one by contradiction, and one from consequence. The one by contradiction is that from which the contrary will follow for the person questioned regarding every answer. For example: "My father is either different from your father, or the same." If, then, your father is different from my father, being different from a father, he would not be a father. But if he is the same as my father, being the same as my father, he would be my father. And again: "If man is not an animal, he would be a stone or wood." But he is not a stone or wood. (For he is ensouled, and moves from himself.) Therefore, he is an animal. But if he is an animal, and an animal is either a dog or an ox, then man would also be an animal, and a dog and an ox. And the type of induction by contradiction is...