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CONCERNING THE FIGURES

The second triangular figure.

The second figure consists of three triangles: namely, those of difference, concordance, and contrariety, as they appear within it. $\P$ Above the angle of difference are written: the sensible and the sensible; the sensible and the intellectual; and the intellectual and the intellectual. The same applies to the angles of concordance and contrariety. This is to signify the difference that exists between one sensible thing and another—for example, between one body and another. It also signifies the difference between the sensible and the intellectual—such as between the body and the soul—and between the intellectual and the intellectual—such as between God and an angel. The same logic follows for concordance and contrariety. $\P$ Above the angle of the beginning original: "principii" are written: cause, quantity, and time. By "cause," the substantial principles are signified, which are the efficient, formal, material, and final causes. By "quantity" and "time," the accidental principles are signified, such as the nine categories nine categories: refers to Aristotle's 'predicaments,' the basic ways in which things can be described, such as quality, relation, or place. $\P$ Above the angle of the middle are written: junction, measurement, and extremity, to signify the three species of the "middle." For instance, the middle of junction is like a nail that joins two posts together. The middle of measurement is like a center point that exists equally in the middle of a circle. The middle of the extremities is like a line in the middle between two points points?.

Three species of the end.

$\P$ Above the angle of the end original: "finis" are written: termination, privation, and final cause, to denote that there are three species of an end. For there is an end of termination, like the boundary of a kingdom or a field. Likewise, there is an end of privation, such as death, which finishes life. And there is a causal end, such as God, who is the end and cause of all things. $\P$ Above the angle of majority—and the same for the angles of equality and minority—is written: "between substance and substance." This is to signify that one substance is greater than another, such as the substance of a human, which is greater in goodness or virtue than the substance of a stone. $\P$ Likewise, "between substance and accident," to signify that a substance is greater than an accident, such as the substance of a human being greater than his size original: "quantitas" and similar qualities. $\P$ And "between accident and accident," to denote that one accident is greater than another, such as understanding being greater than sensing. The same can be said in its own way regarding minority, since these terms are relative to one another. And between substance and substance there is equality, as with a human and a stone, which are equal in the general category of substance. Between accident and accident there is equality, such as understanding and loving, which are equal in the category of accidents. And between substance and accident there is equality, such as quantity and its subject, which are equal through extension and surface area.

The green angle.

$\P$ The green angle, which consists of difference, concordance, and contrariety, is general to all things. For whatever exists is either in a state of difference, concordance, or contrariety. Within the triangle itself, everything is implicit. However, difference is more general than concordance or contrariety. For more things can be different than can be concordant or contrary. For example, Peter and Martin are different; they agree in species original: "specie conveniunt," meaning they are both human; but they are contrary in their characters, for one is just while the other is unjust. And so it goes for others in their own way.

M. 1

$\P$ Difference is the cause of plurality, just as concordance is the cause of unity. For just as difference distinguishes between one thing and another, so concordance composes many things into one. Contrariety, however, corrupts and dissolves. Therefore, just as the green triangle exists naturally in a subject, so the intellect is morally discursive: distinguishing, concording, descending, and ascending through the three species of difference, concordance, and contrariety mentioned above. And so, the intellect with "difference" is simply general to its object. The same applies to concordance and contrariety. But when it constrains itself through the scale established in the three species, it is neither entirely general nor entirely special. For example, when it says: "difference exists between the sensible and the sensible," and so on; but when it descends to individuals, it is, in a moral sense, entirely particular.

The red triangle.

$\P$ The red triangle, which consists of the beginning, middle, and end, is general to all things, because it contains all things within itself; whatever exists is either in the beginning, the middle, or the end. Outside of these three terms, no being can exist. The "beginning" is a being to which all other beings are subordinate. Yet a universal beginning can by no means exist without nature or morality, having within itself that which begins, that which is begun, and the act of beginning original: "principiante, principiatum & principiare." This is a core Lullian concept: every attribute has an active, passive, and verbal form..

triangular principles

For just as the nature of heat cannot exist without a heater, a thing to be heated, and the act of heating, so the nature of a "beginning" cannot exist without the nature of the three things predicted above. Thus, the artist The practitioner of the Lullian Art. must recognize these three in the universal beginning, because they belong to its essence causally through the proper qualities of the subject. They do not exist merely occasionally, for they are acquired in a moral sense. Causal principles speak of necessity, while occasional principles speak of contingency and "well-being." $\P$ And so the artist must ascend and descend from the universal to the particular and vice-versa. $\P$ The "middle" is as universal as the "beginning." For just as an agent with a principle...

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