Vat.gr.244

For men, man is an animal, rational, mortal, capable of mind and knowledge; if one adds "grammatical," he makes the expression redundant. For it cannot encompass every part, but only those things contained under the universal man. For man is not merely a rational animal [et cetera], but if there is something according to the word, it is not according to the understanding of man, but also of men, such as this one or that one, and their subsistence.

P

In its proper place, the animal, being a genus, is predicated of man, horse, and ox. They differ from each other also in species, not only in time. For that through which it differs is other, because the property, according to which it exists as a species, is not, or is not predicated of, the individuals under the species. As "risible," of man and of individual men. But the genus is not predicated of one species, but of many and differing ones. It differs by saying why it is not that which is also among the common accidents, because even if differences and common accidents are predicated of many and differing things in species.

Regarding the eye, you act, for example: they say it, but also that they differ in species. To differ in species is not according to the logical art, since none of the things existing under the species differ from each other in species. For the individuals differ from each other in number. For the difference is predicated of many and of those differing in species, as "rational" exists for man [in number]. As one might say, the one exists in the question of "what it is," as the genus; the other in the question of "what kind of thing it is," as the difference. So that even if it is predicated of many, it is not in the question of "what it is"—I mean many and each other. Likewise, animals are not in the question of "what it is."

But the individual men differ from each other in place, time, shape, and species. For the species, humanity, is the same in all men. But the accounts of men differ from each other; for man has one account and the horse another. But also men differ from each other according to the quantity of age. So they differ from each other in species by that of age. Whence the ancients say that "species" is said in many ways. One is the species according to the relation to the genus—for example, man in relation to animal. The other is the species according to the form and the idea, as when we say that it differs in species.

D

But the difference and the common accidents are the "differing."