The Collected Works of Sextus Empiricus (1718) - Page 28

...types of philosophizing are considered to be: Dogmatic, Academic, and Sceptic. To treat the former two shall be the task of others; but regarding the Sceptic institution, we shall speak briefly, placing the main headings of the matter before your eyes. We preface this by stating that regarding none of the things we say do we pronounce them in such a way as to affirm that the matter is exactly as we say, nor do we approve it with an assertion; rather, we set them out by narrating in a historical manner The term "historical" here implies a descriptive report of one’s own impressions or "appearances," rather than a claim to objective, scientific truth. what currently appears to us concerning each thing.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE METHODS OF TREATING SCEPTIC PHILOSOPHY.

5. Of Sceptic Philosophy, one treatment is called general, and the other special. The general treatment is that in which we set forth the characteristics and form of Scepsis, declaring what its notion is, what its principles, its arguments, its instrument for judging, and what its end is; likewise, the modes of suspension of judgment, and how we understand the negative expressions of the Sceptics. Furthermore, how this doubt-filled consideration or Scepsis is distinguished from those modes of philosophizing that are neighboring to it. 6. The special treatment of Scepticism is that in which we contradict each part of what is called Philosophy. Let us pursue the general treatment in the first place, handing down above all those names by which the Sceptic institution is accustomed to be called.

CHAPTER III.

BY WHICH NAMES THE SCEPTIC DISCIPLINE IS CALLED.

7. The Sceptic institution is also called "Zetetic" or "Inquisitive," from the very action which consists in seeking and using Scepsis. It is also called "Ephectic," from the suspension of assent, which is the state produced in the seeker after the inquiry is made. It is also called "Aporetic," that is, "doubting" or "hesitating," either because it doubts everything...

NOTES.

...indeed they seemed to themselves to have grasped the truth, but it was perhaps still possible that they might grasp it while disputing. Below in chapter 33: original: "ho de Skeptikos endechetai kai katalēphthēnai tina prosdoka" "But it is possible for the Sceptic to expect that some things might be grasped." Hence they are called Zetetics original: "zētētikoi", or "seekers," according to Gellius in Book XI, chapter 5.
G to others it will be suitable original: "heterois harmosei"] This is more correct than in the Savile Manuscript, which reads original: "heteros harmosei legein" "another shall be suitable to speak." Soon after, I restored the article which had fallen out before "Sceptic" from the same sources, S. and U.
H having prefaced that original: "ekeino proeipontes"] The U. manuscript has "having addressed." Furthermore, in denying that he establishes anything while the Sceptic narrates what appears to him, he repeats this same caution more often below, as in Section 15.
I and generally indeed original: "kai katholou men"] The general treatment occupies the whole of the present first book, just as the special treatment occupies the second and third.
K what is its notion original: "tis ennoia autēs"] In chapter four of this book, Sextus disputes what Scepsis is, from which Sceptics, or "those from the Scepsis" original: "hoi apo tēs skepseōs", as they are called in Book 1 Against the Physicists, section 312, and many other places. Therefore, notion original: "ennoia" in this place is the concept of what the Sceptics understand by their doubt. Nor would

...of the 6 Philosophies, there are three: Dogmatic, 8 Academic, and Sceptic. Now, concerning the others, it will be G suitable for others to speak; but regarding the Sceptic path, we shall H speak in outline for the present, H having prefaced this: that regarding none of the things to be said do we firmly maintain that they are exactly as we say, but according to what now appears to us, we 10 report historically concerning each.

CHAPTER 2. ON THE DISCOURSES OF SCEPSIS.

Of Sceptic Philosophy, then, one discourse is called general, and the other special. And the general is 1 that in which we set out the character of Scepsis, stating what 11 its notion K is, and what its principles, and what its arguments; what the criterion is, and what the end; and what are the modes of suspension; and how we employ the Sceptic 12 expressions; L and the distinction of Scepsis from the neighboring philosophies. The special is that in which we speak against each part of what is called Philosophy. Let us first discuss the general discourse, beginning our guidance from the names of the Sceptic path.

CHAPTER 3. ON THE NAMES OF SCEPTICISM.

The Sceptic path, then, 13 is called "Zetetic" from the activity of seeking and inquiring; 14 and "Ephectic" from the M state that comes over the inquirer after the search; and "Aporetic," either from doubting and seeking everything, as some say;

H. Stephanus have disapproved of this interpretation, although in the present place he preferred to render it "what is its mind." Certainly, below in chapter 5, he himself translates notion original: "ennoian" as "notion."
L expressions original: "apophaseis"] Understand the negative voices and formulas of the Sceptics, by which, however, they did not dogmatically deny anything, but renounced all fixed negation just as they did affirmation, professing that nothing for certain is established for them in either direction regarding anything. Such are "no more," "I define nothing," and similar ones, about which see below in Section 14 and Chapter 18 following. Negation original: "Apophasis" is a denial, just as "negative things" original: "apophatika" are negations in Cicero’s Topics. Simplicius in his Commentary on the Categories (p. 44) says: "what affirmation original: "kataphasis" signifies in the soul, this is negation original: "apophasis" in the voice." Our author says this below in Section 12.
M concerning the seeker original: "peri ton skeptomenon"] So in the U. and S. manuscripts, not as in the printed editions "concerning the seekers." Regarding the names of the Sceptic discipline, Diogenes Laertius (IX. 69, 70) hands down the same things; consult him if you please.