Critical History of Philosophy

it does not separate those who are properly called philosophers from those who are improperly, or indeed not rarely falsely, so called; rather, it wanders widely and without order through the entire ambit of erudition—which is far removed from philosophy—and mixes square with round. Yet, it omits what is most necessary and what constitutes, as it were, every point in the history of philosophy, while having brought in matters that did not belong here; even though, with a wondrous pomp of words, it promises the most accurate treatment at the outset, thus, as they say, mocking the gaping crows.

Definition of wisdom & philosophy.

§. II. Philosophy is, in truth, the love, or rather the pursuit, of wisdom; but wisdom is the solid knowledge of truth concerning those things—whether they be divine or human—that contribute to the true happiness of man and can be applied to use and practice in their own way. If this application is correctly instituted, and thereby the true happiness of man is promoted, then at last it exhibits wisdom taken in its genuine signification. By this very fact, it distinguishes wisdom from philosophy, which expounds the principles and rules of divine and human truth and hands down the method by which the happiness of the human race may be acquired, preserved, or increased; and thus, resting upon its own foundations, it begets science—unless, however, it is converted into use, it is unworthy of the name of wisdom. For

He who cannot be wise to his own benefit, is wise in vain,

rightly admonished ENNIUS. v) In CICERO, Epist. Famil. Bk. VII. ep. 6. Nor do the various definitions of philosophy by the ancients say otherwise, w) We shall note these in their proper place. Meanwhile, one should consult G. J. VOSSIUS, De Philosophia, ch. II. §. 5. p. 4. et seqq.; SENECA, ep. 89. especially those from the school of Pythagoras and Plato, except that they express a peculiar end, by which it is permitted to man to attain true happiness; and it is rightly concluded that unless this is intended with every effort, all knowledge is vain. Whence it is not without reason that Varro, in CICERONEM, x) Academ. Quaest. Bk. I. T. IV. Opp. ed. D. Godofr. p. 7. reminded us that Socrates was called the wisest of all by Apollo because this was the whole of all wisdom: not to think that one knows what one does not know, and hence his entire discourse would be consumed in praising virtue and in exhorting all men to the pursuit of virtue. y) Similar things are found everywhere among the ancients; see ANTONINUS and STOBAEUS in Florilegium, Serm. CXX, CXXI, CXXII, p. 702 et seqq., Wechel edit. GATAKER will provide the stars [i.e., notes] to Antoninus, Bk. X. §. 16. p. m. 365. Sources of wisdom. There is, however, a twofold source of knowledge of the truth that leads to the possession of the true good and the happiness arising therefrom: one is the rule of innate light, or human reason, and the other is divine revelation. For since the human intellect is circumscribed by such narrow limits that it is unable to survey the vast fields of universal truth, or indeed even to know all those things which the reason of human happiness nevertheless demands be known and understood, it was necessary that divine revelation should bring aid to man and instruct him about those things which are apt to place his happiness in the highest position. As this occupies theology most of all—the duty of which is to instruct man in those things which God has revealed to him through revelation—it must also be separated from philosophy, nor should the sciences be confused with one another by the principle, as they say, of knowing.