Aristotle's Problems

Giorgio Valla of Piacenza sends many greetings to Giovanni Marliani, mathematician, and most distinguished in all philosophy and medicine.

Ornamental woodcut initial A featuring a classical figure and foliate patterns.The Problems of Alexander of Aphrodisias, the most excellent philosopher and physician, I have translated into Latin at your urging and under your auspices, O Giovanni Marliani, a man of far-reaching learning. Because you told me that you wished them to be interpreted, I judged that they ought to be dedicated to you for many reasons: both because you, as my teacher, since you used to profess medicine and the mathematical sciences publicly, may by right seem to demand back some fruit from me, your pupil, as if from a stock which you yourself planted; and because I, for my part, even if you do not ask—though I might not be able to offer works as most learned as your immense erudition would demand—nevertheless seem to be rightly bound to present you with those that are not ungrateful, which I am confident I shall clearly achieve. Furthermore, because no one can better weigh and judge the quality of these things than you, whose name for distinguished learning in all the noble arts is such that all Italy itself cannot contain the fame of it. Furthermore, because I trust that this labor of mine will bring no small benefit to your sons, Girolamo, Pietro Antonio, and Paolo—youths of exceptional character and of great future erudition. Indeed, they display such prudence and such modesty that they seem easily held by the study of all the noble arts. Certainly, a very sharp intellect shines forth; and neither is dialectical acumen lacking for investigating and explaining the causes of things, nor is eloquence missing for examining the demonstrations of geometry—which I have certainly been able to observe in person.

And so, I not only think, but hold for certain, that they will observe these choice questions, especially since their usefulness can be conjectured from this: that by the consensus of many learned men, medicine is fourfold—as Hippocrates shows and argues even in the very beginning of the Aphorisms. It is perfected by art, which flows from precepts and principles concerning the nature of things, seeing that it very rarely serves that which is of accidental origin. Nevertheless, medicine is not thought to be alien even to fortune, since it is fitting to seize the opportunity of time, as if in a fluid body because of the unstable matter. Next, experience; for this also exercises and confirms reason, and adapts it to the qualities of diseases. Afterward, judgment: since it is capable of all things that fall under the intellect by that divine power implanted in our souls, it directs and adjudicates those three: art, experience, and opportunity.

Of these things, I say, there is nothing that this Alexander of Aphrodisias has not touched upon, an author truly excelling among the foremost in all matters. But it is not only the utility of medicine that stands out here; indeed, the whole conduct of human life is perceived, because he applies precepts for obtaining good habits not only of the body but also of the mind—although the purgings of the body are also transferred to the mind. But since the incorporeal food of the soul is learning, from this we may observe how many healthy precepts he has handed down to us for the maintenance of the body and the instruction of the mind; nor has he woven them together only in a scattered way, but also what kinds of inquiry there are, and how many, with the most profitable brevity and very lucid clarity, teaching how to resolve all things that are proposed.

But since we have made mention of the kinds of questions, we think it by no means foreign to bring forward the opinion of certain most learned men on this matter. For they have so divided the kinds of questions that they would have two primary ones: one, indeed, which regards an infinite matter, without any definite embrace; the other, however, which looks to a definite matter. And furthermore, they have partitioned each of these into two other kinds: one which refers to knowing, the other which refers to acting. For either the knowledge and science itself is sought—such as whether medicine be a science or an art—or the counsel for acting—such as whether the care of supplying food ought to be undertaken by the physician.

Of knowledge, moreover, they make three species: conjecture, definition, and consequence. Conjecture is as when it is asked whether there is any power of medicine in magic. Definition is such as "what is medicine." Consequence is when it is asked what follows each thing—as, for what reason those among the bilious who vomit black bile labor under great danger. Of action, indeed, they will there to be two species: one for pursuing or avoiding—such as by what things the body can be led to a good habit, or avoid a bad habit; the other which refers to some advantage and use—such as how it is fitting for a physician to conduct himself in the presence of the sick.

Again, they have distributed the method of conjecture into four parts. For it either asks what a thing is—such as what is the best habit of the body; or what is the origin of each thing—such as what are the natural principles, of which sort are all obscure things; or questions of causes and reasons in natural things or other disciplines; or the treatment of the cause—as if one were to ask why the most eminent authors disagree among themselves about the principles of nature or in the curing of a single sickness; or about change—as if it were asked whether, upon the approach of death, knowledge perishes in the soul of man, or is changed. To definition are assigned property, division, and partition—as that which is, as it were, impressed upon the minds of all. When it is sought what is proper to each thing—as in man, whether...