Praeside Deo Optimo Maximo: Ex decreto et authoritate amplissimi Iurisconsultorum Collegii in inclyta Basiliensium Academia, pro solenni Docturae gradu in utroque Iure consequendo, subsequentes de litis contestatione Theses

so he who responds that he neither admits nor denies the narrative and petition of the plaintiff can be sued for the full amount.

XLVIII.
According to the common opinion of the Doctors legal scholars, a suit is contested with these words: "I deny the narrated facts, just as they are narrated," or with these words: "I deny that the requested items ought to be performed, just as they are requested."

XLIX.
This opinion of the Doctors seems to be admitted in those cases in which the narrative and the petition are so connected that, if one is denied, the other also collapses.

L.
Today, in all judgments, one responds to the action of the plaintiff by the defendant with this formula in particular: "I deny the narrated facts as they are narrated, and I state that the requested items ought not to be performed."

LI.
In order for a suit to be truly and correctly contested with these words, one must see whether the plaintiff has requested something generally in his written pleading, or whether he has accumulated many heads claims or points, some of which might be true and others false, or finally, whether he has requested one single thing in specie specifically.

LII.
In the first case, a suit is not correctly contested with this general formula; but in the second, the defendant rightly responds by distinguishing; in the third case, the defendant also acts correctly if, just as he requests something specifically, he also responds specifically.

LIII.
Hence arises that question: if the defendant responds simply and denies the narrated facts as they are narrated, is he understood to deny each individual point contained in the proposed action, or is he understood to deny only some things and not others?

LIIII.
Salycetus's distinction pleases; according to his opinion, he reports: