Theses iuridicae et inaugurales de appellationibus

XLIII.

He who has interposed an appeal has the license to revoke it and provoke anew to another Judge: just as he who has appealed by word of mouth can appeal another time, within the ten-day period, in writing.

XLIIII.

But there is doubt as to which appeal is valid, and from which the time of prosecution should begin to run. I think it should be answered by a distinction: if it was provoked twice to the same Judge, the time of the fatals should be counted from the first; if to different judges, from the latter, although Minsinger observed that in the Chamber it was left to the discretion of the appellant.

XLV.

And while an appeal is pending, and within the ten-day period before the appeal is interposed, the Judge's sentence is in suspense, such that he cannot execute it, nor innovate anything; since the appeal reduces the cause to the prior state in which it was after the contestation of the lawsuit.

XLVI.

For if an appeal was made from a definitive sentence, whatever is innovated is immediately rescinded by the office of the Judge; if from an interlocutory one, then finally, when the appeal is approved, the Judge is interdicted. But things attempted before the inhibition are annihilated by the principal sentence decided through the appeal.